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This paper examines whether there is a political budget cycle (PBC) in countries in the euro 
area. Using a multivariate model for the period 1999-2004 and various election indicators we 
find strong evidence that the Stability and Growth Pact has not restricted fiscal policy makers 
in the euro area in pursuing expansionary policies before elections. In an election-year – but 
not in the year prior to the election – the budget deficit increases. This result is in line with 
third generation PBC models, which are based on moral hazard. We also find a significant but 
small partisan effect on fiscal policy outcomes.  
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 1.  Introduction 
It is often thought that incumbents try to use expansionary fiscal policy before elections to 
increase their popularity. However, most empirical studies examining the existence of a political 
budget cycle (PBC)
1 in industrial countries find little support for such election-driven fiscal policy 
manipulations.
2 As Brender and Drazen (2005) point out, until recently a PBC was generally 
thought to be a phenomenon of less developed economies. For instance, Schuknecht (1996) 
reports evidence for a PBC in his sample of 35 developing countries over the period 1970-92.
3 In 
addition, Block (2002) finds for a cross-section of 44 Sub-Saharan African countries that the 
government fiscal deficit increases by 1.2 percentage points in election years. 
However, some recent studies present evidence for the existence of a PBC in a large 
cross-section of both developed and developing countries. For instance, Shi and Svensson (2002) 
show that significant pre-electoral increases in the government budget deficit exist for their panel 
of 91 developing and developed countries over the period 1975-95. Moreover, Persson and 
Tabellini (2002) report statistically significant tax decreases before elections in a sample of 60 
democracies over the period 1960-98. Brender and Drazen (2005) pose, however, that the results 
of these studies are driven by the experience of so-called “new democracies”, where fiscal 
manipulation may be effective because of lack of experience with electoral politics in these 
countries. They argue that once the “new democracies” are removed from the sample, the PBC 
disappears. Nonetheless, also some recent studies focusing on “established democracies” find 
evidence for the existence of a PBC.
 4
Some of these studies examine whether a PBC exists in member countries of the European 
Union (EU). Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) investigate whether incumbent governments 
manipulated fiscal policy in order to enhance re-election perspectives. Their empirical evidence 
for the 1970–1998 period does not support this hypothesis.
5 Still, other studies focusing on the 
“old” member countries of the EU claim that in more recent years fiscal policy often turned 
expansionary before elections. For instance, Buti and van den Noord (2003) come to this 
                                                   
1 A political budget cycle is a periodic fluctuation in a government’s fiscal policies, which is induced by the cyclicality 
of elections. Shi and Svensson (2004) review some recent developments in the theory and evidence of these cycles. 
See also Franzese (2002) and Drazen (2000) for extensive reviews of the literature. 
2 There are exceptions, however. For instance, Alesina et al. (1997), who perform cross-section time series regressions 
on a panel of 13 OECD countries for the period between 1961 and 1993, find that the government budget deficit is 0.6 
percent of GDP higher in election years. Also Franzese (2000) reports evidence for electoral manipulation of fiscal 
policy in his sample of 20 OECD countries. 
3 Likewise, Schuknecht (2000) finds for a sample of twenty-four developing countries for the 1973–1992 period that 
incumbent governments tend to increase public investment prior to elections. 
4 For instance, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) find support for a PBC in their sample of OECD countries for the period 
1970-2002. Alt and Lassen (2005) argue that among advanced democracies significant opportunistic electoral cycles 
are conditional on the transparency of budget institutions. In countries with less transparent institutions the electoral 
cycle in fiscal policy appears, while no such election-related fiscal policy movements show up in higher-transparency 
countries. 
5 Also De Haan and Sturm (1994) find no support for PBCs in their analysis of fiscal policy in EU member countries. 
  2conclusion based on an examination of the discretionary part of fiscal policy over the 1999-2002 
period. Also von Hagen (2003) concludes that there is evidence for a PBC in EU member 
countries. For the period 1998-2002 he finds that the (unweighted) average fiscal impulse in pre-
election years is significantly higher than the average fiscal impulse in all other country-year 
cases.
6
The results of these last two papers are perhaps somewhat surprising since member 
countries of the EU are restricted in their fiscal policies by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
The SGP consists of two Council Regulations: one on the strengthening of the surveillance and 
co-ordination of budgetary positions, and the other on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. A corresponding European Council Resolution 
ties them together. Regulation 1466/97 sets out to strengthen multilateral surveillance and gives 
member states a goal of a medium term budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus. 
Regulation 1467/97 clarifies and accelerates the excessive deficit procedure as specified in the 
Maastricht Treaty so that – in principle – within 10 months non-interest bearing deposits and 
ultimately fines can be imposed in case the member state concerned takes no effective actions to 
redress so-called excessive deficits (measured against reference values of 3% of GDP for the 
general government budget deficit and 60% for the general government debt-to-GDP ratio).
7 
According to Buti and van den Noord (2003, p. 4), the SGP “is unquestionably the most stringent 
supranational ‘commitment technology’ ever adopted by sovereign governments on a voluntary 
basis in the attempt to establish and maintain sound public finances. The SGP, if applied 
according to its letter and spirit, will have important implications for the behaviour of budgetary 
authorities in both the short term (cyclical stabilisation, policy co-ordination) and long term 
(sustainability of public finances).” 
This paper examines whether there really exists a PBC in EU member countries in the 
euro area. We focus on EU members that have adopted the euro since the rules of the SGP are less 
strict for member countries that are not part of the currency union. In contrast to Buti and van den 
Noord (2003) and von Hagen (2003) we use a multivariate model. Furthermore, instead of 
employing election dummies – like most previous PBC studies – we use an election variable 
suggested by Franzese (2000) that takes the timing of an election in the course of a year into 
account. On the basis of data for the period 1999-2004 we find strong evidence that the SGP has 
not restricted fiscal policy makers in the euro area in pursuing expansionary policies before 
elections. In an election-year – but not in the year prior to the election – the budget deficit 
                                                   
6 However, the evidence of von Hagen is not very convincing. For instance, he takes both presidential and 
parliamentary elections into account even though presidents in some countries have hardly any influence on policy-
making. De Haan et al. (2003) could not replicate his findings. 
7 See Amtenbrink and De Haan (2003) for an extensive discussion of the SGP. De Haan et al. (2004) examine the 
weaknessess of the SGP. See also Schuknecht (2004). 
  3increases. This result is in line with third generation PBC models, which are based on moral 
hazard. We also find that the political composition of the government has a significant (but small) 
influence on net lending. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers some theoretical 
considerations, while section 3 outlines the empirical model. Section 4 contains the main results 





Three generations of theoretical PBC models can be distinguished. The first generation models 
emphasize the incumbent’s intention to secure re-election by maximizing its expected vote share 
at the next election (Nordhaus, 1975). It is assumed that the electorate has backward-looking 
expectations and evaluates the government on the basis of its past track record. As a result, these 
models imply that governments, regardless of ideological orientation, adopt expansionary fiscal 
policies in the late year(s) of their term in office in order to stimulate the economy. 
The second generation models – Shi and Svensson (2004) call them adverse selection-type 
models – emphasize the role of temporary information asymmetries regarding the politicians’ 
competence level in explaining electoral cycles in fiscal policy. In these models, signalling is the 
driving force behind the PBC. The first of these models is due to Rogoff and Sibert (1988), who 
assume that each political candidate has a competence level (high or low), which is only known to 
the politician and not to the electorate. Voters want to elect the more competent politician and 
form rational expectations regarding the incumbent’s type based on observable current fiscal 
policy outcomes. Before the election, the high-type incumbent will attempt to signal his type (and 
thereby increase his chances of re-election) by engaging in expansionary fiscal policy, which is 
less “costly” for him than it is for the low type. This leads to a pre-election increase in the 
government deficit when a competent politician is in office.
9 As pointed out by Shi and Svensson 
(2004), some of the implications of the signalling models seem to be at odds with both empirical 
and anecdotal evidence. For example, only the more competent politician (rather than the less 
competent one) distorts the economy in the separating equilibrium of the signalling game. 
Likewise, only competent politicians will be re-elected. Furthermore, since only competent types 
signal by creating a boom before an election, the testable implications are unclear without 
additional information on the (unobservable) type of the incumbent. 
                                                   
8 This section heavily draws on Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) and Shi and Svensson (2004). 
9 Rogoff (1990) argues that the incumbent can also signal his competence before an election by shifting government 
expenditure towards easily observed consumption spending and away from investment. 
  4These drawbacks do not apply to the third generation PBC models, which are based on 
moral hazard. Examples of such studies are Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Shi and Svensson 
(2002). As in the adverse selection models, it is assumed that each politician has some 
competence level which is unknown to the electorate. However, in addition it is assumed that also 
the politician himself cannot ex ante observe this competence level. Therefore, politicians are 
uncertain about how well they will be able to handle future problems. Voters are rational and want 
to elect the most competent politician since that would imply higher post-election public goods 
production. Their inference is based on the observable macroeconomic performance of the 
incumbent government. The key assumption is that the incumbent government can exert a hidden 
effort, that is, to use a policy instrument unobservable to the public, which is a substitute for 
competence. For example, if competence measures how well the politician can convert revenues 
into public goods, then the hidden effort can be interpreted as the government’s short-term excess 
borrowing. Elections take place after the incumbent government’s hidden effort and competence 
have jointly determined the observable macroeconomic outcome. The incumbent government 
would like to increase its performance index by exerting more effort (borrow more), hoping that 
voters would attribute the boost in public goods provision to its competence. In the equilibrium of 
this moral hazard game, there will be an excessive effort on the part of the incumbent politician, 
and as a result there is an increase in the budget deficit prior to an election. In these models all 
types of incumbent governments will incur excessive pre-election budget deficits (independent of 
their competence level). As Shi and Svensson (2004) point out, one can test these empirical 
predictions no matter whether the type of the incumbent government is observable. Furthermore, 
the implications of this model can be tested for all countries that have elections, irrespective of 
their political structure (e.g. the existence of partisan differences). 
 
3. Empirical model and data  
Apart from electoral influences, we take two factors into account in our empirical model that are 
not controlled by policy makers but affect fiscal policy outcomes. First, we include the output gap 
as a proxy for the business cycle. An economic upswing will lead to an increase in the budget 
balance, while in the downward phase of the business cycle the balance usually deteriorates. As 
there is no consensus in the literature how to construct the output gap, we use output gaps based 
on potential GDP as well as output gaps calculated on the basis of trend GDP (employing a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter). 
Second, since unforeseen economic developments may affect fiscal policy outcomes we 
include the difference between actual and expected real GDP growth. The expected growth rates 
are the GDP forecasts as available at the time the government budget was decided upon. A higher 
  5than expected growth rate will lead to an increase in the budget balance due to, amongst others, 
unexpected increases in tax receipts. Likewise, unexpected inflation may have an effect on the 
budget balance. As pointed out by Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), inflation may affect government 
receipts and expenditures through nominal progression in tax rates and tax brackets, and via price-
indexation of receipts and expenditures. On the other hand unexpected inflation erodes the real 
value of nominal government debt so that the overall effect of inflation on the budget balance is 
not clear a priori.  
After accounting for the effects of business cycle fluctuations and forecasting errors in 
GDP growth and inflation, all remaining changes in the budget balance are considered to be the 
result of discretionary fiscal policy. These considerations suggests estimating the following 
equation: 
 
() () ( )
ff
it 0 1 it it 2 it it 3 it 4 it BB = β +β y- y βπ -π +β GAP +β ( ) ε Election Measure ∆+ ∆ +  (1) 
 
where:  
it BB ∆    =  the change in the overall budget balance as measured by the change in 
   net  lending; 
f
it it y- y   =  the difference between actual real GDP growth at time t and real growth 
    as forecasted at the time fiscal policy for year t was determined; 
f
it it π -π   =  the difference between actual inflation at time t and inflation as
  forecasted at the time fiscal policy for year t was determined; 
it GAP ∆   =  the change in the output gap in year t as a percentage of GDP.  
 
In order to take account of potential election effects, two alternative indicators are considered. The 
first involves adding a dummy to the equation which indicates whether a year is an election-year 
or not. A similar dummy will be used to account for pre-election years. As fiscal policy decisions 
may take some time to have an effect, election-induced fiscal measures could be taken in the year 
prior to the actual election.  
The second indicator takes the timing of an election in the course of the year into account. 
It has been developed by Franzese (2000) and is calculated as 
 
( ) it ELE = M 1 +d/D /12 − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
 
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days in 
that month. For the year prior to the election year the indicator is calculated as: 
  6 
( ) it ELE = 12 M 1 d/D /12 −− − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
 
In all other years its value is set to zero.
10  
The macroeconomic data necessary to estimate the model have been obtained from 
stability programmes of the EU countries and official publications of the European Commission. 
Data on general election dates are mainly taken from political data yearbooks (Katz and Koole 
(1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) and Van Biezen  and Katz (2004)). The sample contains 
observations for all twelve countries in the euro area
11 over the time period 1999 to 2004. The 
appendix contains a detailed overview of the data sources used. 
 
IV. Results 
Columns I and II of Table 1 present benchmark regressions that only contain the economic control 
variables. The difference between the regressions is the output gap variable used; in column I this 
variable is constructed on the basis of potential output, while in column II it is calculated on the 
basis of trend income. It follows that only the coefficients for the output gap measures are 
significantly different from zero. 
 
                                                   
10For reasons that become clear later, we want to be able to interpret the values of the election indicator in terms of 
actual election dates. This means that an indicator value of, for instance, 7/12 in an election year as well as a value of 
5/12 in a pre-election year imply elections take place at the end of July. For consistency, this requires that snap 
elections are ignored because in that case election-driven policy manipulations can only occur in the period between 
the government crisis and the election. 
11 The countries in the euro area are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
  7Table 1. Estimation results – Election dummy 
it BB ∆   Dependent Variable 
Equation Nr.  I               II III IV V VI VII VIII



















































it GAP ∆    0.2496 
(0.0702)*  -  0.2335 
(0.1084)  -  0.1898 
(0.0593)*  -  0.1723 
(0.1296)  - 
Trend GDP
it GAP ∆   -  0.3055 
(0.0203)**  -  0.2740 
(0.0434)**  -  0.2180 
(0.0298)**  -  0.1871 
(0.1018) 
Pre-election year
it D   -        - -0.4928 
(0.0775)* 
-0.4569 













Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.13                2.17 2.18 2.21 2.04 2.04 2.18 2.18
Adjusted R
2 0.20                0.22 0.25 025 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.44
Note: Balanced sample of 72 observations and 12 cross sections; panel generalized least squares (cross-section weights) with common effects (F-test does 
not reject estimating a common intercept instead of fixed effects); White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors & covariance; p-values between 
parentheses: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  8 In columns III and IV a pre-election year dummy is added to the model. In both 
specifications the election coefficients have a negative sign but are not very significant. Moreover, 
the fit of the model does not improve substantially compared to the benchmark regressions. 
However, this changes when the pre-election year dummy is replaced by an election year dummy 
(columns V and VI). Now the adjusted R-squared rises to about 0.46 and the election effect is 
highly significant. Also an unexpected increase in GDP growth has a positive and significant 
effect on the budget balance. However, the coefficient of unexpected inflation remains 
insignificant. Finally, columns VII and VIII of Table 1 present specifications in which pre-
election as well as election year dummies are included. The pre-election year dummy becomes 
somewhat more significant than before, but the fit of the model decreases slightly compared to the 
specification in which only an election year dummy is taken into account. 
  Table 2 presents the results that are obtained when possible election effects are modelled 
more accurately, that is, by means of the election indicator as suggested by Franzese (2000). In 
columns I and II an indicator is added, labelled with the superscript ‘standard’, which comprises 
both pre-election and election years. The coefficients of the output gap and unexpected GDP 
growth are significantly different from zero. There is also a highly significant election effect. If 
the election variable is decomposed into separate effects for pre-election and election years, the 
same pattern as in Table 1 becomes visible. Columns III and IV of Table 2 show that there is no 
effect in the pre-election year, while columns V and VI indicate the existence of a highly 
significant effect during the election year. This is underlined by the high adjusted R-squared. 
Columns VII and VIII of Table 2 show that including the two indicators simultaneously does not 
lead to a significant effect during pre-election years.  
So our results suggest that only during the election year the budget deficit increases. This 
increase amounts to 0.96% of GDP according to the model with the election year dummy and 
0.83% of GDP according to the model with the election-year indicator.
12 The latter figure is 
obtained trough multiplication of the coefficient estimate for the election year indicator obtained 
in column VI of Table 2, with the average value of the indicator over all election years, which is 
0.38 in our sample. 
                                                   
12 This conclusion is not affected by the exclusion of snap elections in calculating the election indicators (results 
available on request). 
  9Table 2. Estimation results – Election indicator 
it BB ∆   Dependent Variable 
Equation Nr.  I               II III IV V VI VII VIII



















































it GAP ∆    0.2558 
(0.0253)**  -  0.2575 
(0.0731)*  -  0.2363 





it GAP ∆   -  0.3063 
(0.0094)*** -  0.2973 
(0.0276)***  -  0.2603 
(0.0085)*** -    -
Standard
it ELE   -1.2285 
(0.0007)*** 
-1.1732 
(0.0012)*** -            - - - - -
Pre-election year
it ELE   -        - -0.3778 
(0.3745) 
-0.3229 













Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.27                2.31 2.16 2.20 2.17 2.19 2.24 2.26
Adjusted R
2 0.38                0.37 0.20 0.21 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.45
Note: Balanced sample of 72 observations and 12 cross sections; panel generalized least squares (cross-section weights) with common effects (F-test does 
not reject estimating a common intercept instead of fixed effects); White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors & covariance; p-values between 
parentheses: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  10 At first sight it seems rather peculiar that there exists such a large difference between the 
effects of pre-election and election years. Puzzling as it might seem, there is a plausible 
explanation for this phenomenon that can be derived from the third generation PBC models as 
outlined in section 2. In these models, it is assumed that the government uses short-term excess 
borrowing as a hidden effort – that is, as a policy instrument unobservable to the electorate – in 
order to increase its performance index. Borrowing extra money during a pre-election year is less 
easy to hide in comparison to borrowing during an election year since information on the pre-
election year’s budget deficit is likely to be published prior to the election date. As a result, the 
policy instrument is not unobservable anymore since all excess government borrowing will be 
noticed by the electorate. Consequently, the increase in the government’s performance index will 
not take place. In fact, the index might even decline if the electorate strongly prefers budgetary 
discipline.
13
  The mechanism described above also implies that the relationship between the timing of 
an election during the year and electoral-induced fiscal policy manipulations is non-monotonic. 
There is a trade-off between two effects: a higher value of the election-year measure indicates that 
during that year there is ample time for the government to increase its performance index, but a 
higher value of the election-year variable also indicates that it will be more difficult for the 
government to adequately hide its efforts from the electorate since more reliable statistics on the 
size of the budget balance are available to the public. 
  To test this further, we decompose the election-year indicator into four variables. The first 
variable contains all values for the indicator within the interval [0.00; 0.25], the second contains 
the values within [0.25; 0.50] and the third and fourth contain the values within [0.50; 0.75] and 
[0.75; 1.00]. Columns I and II of Table 3 present the results. Clearly, both models fit the data 
substantially better than the models estimated before, and the products of interval means and 
coefficient values
14 indeed suggest that the relationship between the change in net lending and the 
value of the election year indicator is non-linear. This is further supported by the results from 
columns III and IV, which account for a non-linear election effect by using a squared election-
year indicator in addition to the original one. The model fit is quite good and the coefficients for 




                                                   
13 There is some evidence (see, for instance, Brender 2003) suggesting that a deterioration of the financial position of 
the government harms the chances of re-election faced by the incumbent. Brender (2003) argues that this should be the 
case in all “well developed democracies” where voters can monitor the evolution of public finances. Drazen and 
Eslava (2003) try to reconcile this fiscal conservativeness and the PBC. 
14 These are not reported here but they can easily be calculated from the information provided in Table 3. 
  11Table 3. Estimation results – Election-year indicator with non-linear effect 
it BB ∆   Dependent Variable 
Equation Nr.  I  II III IV V VI 







































it GAP ∆    0.1956 
(0.0034)***  -  0.2009 
(0.0138)**  -  0.2981 
(0.0002)***  - 
Trend GDP
it GAP ∆   -  0.1967 
(0.0062)*** -  0.2140 
(0.0076)*** -  0.2785 
(0.0003)***
Election year (0.00-0.25)
it ELE   -1.5859 
(0.4274) 
-1.7206 
(0.3292)  - - - - 
Election year (0.25-0.50)
it ELE   -2.9140 
(0.0000)*** 
-2.8959 
(0.0000)*** - - - - 
Election year (0.50-0.75)
it ELE   -0.7125 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.6366 
(0.0000)*** - - - - 
Election year (0.75-1.00)
it ELE   -0.4279 
(0.0278)** 
-0.4588 
(0.0186)**  - - - - 
Election year






















Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.16 2.17 2.10 2.10 2.12 2.13 
Adjusted R
2 0.72 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.69 0.67 
Note: Balanced sample of 72 observations and 12 cross sections; panel generalized least squares (cross-section weights) 
with common effects (F-test does not reject estimating a common intercept instead of fixed effects); White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors & covariance; p-values between parentheses: *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
  12The pattern that can be derived from the coefficient estimates for the election effect is 
depicted in Figure 1. The graph shows that fiscal policy becomes more expansionary when the 
election date moves from the start of the year towards the middle. This is a consequence of the 
fact that the year becomes increasingly suited for raising government popularity by means of 
supplying extra public goods to the electorate, while the incumbent’s fiscal performance will be 
evaluated primarily on the basis of the past year’s budget balance. However, when the election 
date moves further towards the end of the year information on the budget balance gradually 










5. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to test for the robustness of our results for sample composition, we estimated equations 
III and IV of Table 3 twelve times, each time excluding one country from the sample. Although 
  13the exclusion of France results in an insignificant coefficient for the unexpected growth variable, 
the election effect is always highly significant (results available on request).  
We have also estimated specifications III and IV using different indicators of fiscal policy 
as dependent variable. First, while excluding the output gap as regressor, we used cyclically 
adjusted changes in net lending. Second, we used the level of net lending while adopting the 
output gap level instead of the change therein as a regressor. In both cases, the outcomes were 
highly comparable to ones originally obtained, the election-year effect being somewhat stronger 
under the first case while being slightly weaker under the second (results available on request).   
Next, we have examined whether our findings are influenced by the inclusion of variables 
reflecting political-institutional conditions that have been suggested to affect fiscal policy. We 
checked the sensitivity of our results for the inclusion in specification III of Table 3 of variables 
reflecting i) the type of government, ii) the fractionalisation of government, and iii) the 
positioning of the government on a left-right scale. 
Since Roubini and Sachs (1989), various studies have examined the impact of the type of 
government on fiscal policy outcomes. The basic idea is that coalition governments are weaker 
than single-party majoritarian governments and therefore will end up with higher deficits if the 
country concerned is hit by a negative economic shock. Roubini and Sachs (1989) present 
evidence in support of this view, but other studies reject the hypothesis (see, for example, De 
Haan and Sturm, 1997). To take the type of government into account, we construct a dummy 
which is one in case of a single-party government and zero in all other cases. It turned out that the 
dummy’s coefficient was positive but highly insignificant with a p-value of 0.54. The other results 
remained unchanged. 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) argue that the fractionalisation of government – measured 
by the number of political parties or the number of spending ministers in government – affects 
fiscal policy. The more fragmented the government, i.e. the higher the number of parties or 
spending ministers, the higher will be the budget deficit. There is quite some support for this view 
(see, for instance, Volkerink and de Haan, 2001). Therefore, the number of political parties in 
government as well as the number of spending ministers in government were separately included 
in the regressions. They both failed to reach significance (p-values of 0.18 and 0.91, respectively) 
and did not affect the election effect. 
Since several studies suggest that the political colour of a government affects fiscal policy 
outcomes (see Franzese, 2002 for a discussion)
15, the influence of the government’s positioning 
on a left-right scale was also taken into account. This was done by constructing the variable 
                                                   
15 As Franzese (2000) puts it, at least since Hibbs (1977) political economists have argued that parties of the right and 
left differ in their fiscal policy priorities. Specifically, left-wing governments favor larger public economies, greater 
redistribution, and more Keynesian expansion and so are expected to run greater deficits than right-wing governments. 
  14GCOL, which uses a scaling from 1 for ultra-left to 20 for ultra-right governments. Data on party 
colour were obtained from Benoit and Laver (2005). The estimation results are presented in 
columns V and VI of Table 3. The political composition of the government indeed has a 
significant influence on the change in net lending. However, this influence is rather small. Again, 
adding this variable does not substantially affect the coefficient of our election variables. 
Finally, some specific non-political variables were added to the model as a further 
robustness test. Some previous studies have suggested that there may be asymmetries in fiscal 
responses to recessions and upturns. For instance, Mayes and Viren (2000) argue that during 
recessions governments pursue expansionary fiscal policies to combat the downturn, while during 
economic upswings the proceeds are used for cutting taxes or increasing spending rather than for 
additional consolidation. Therefore, a dummy is constructed that is one in case of a positive 
change in the output gap and is zero otherwise. As it is highly insignificant, with a p-value of 
0.77, there is no reason to assume fiscal policy responds differently in magnitude to positive 
changes in the output gap than to negative changes. Including the variable did not affect our other 
results. 
Also the debt-to-GDP ratio was added to the model as it may capture concerns on the 
sustainability of fiscal policy (Tujula and Wolswijk, 2004). From a sustainability perspective, 
increasing debt ratios should lead to an improvement in the budget balance. In fact, Melitz (2000) 
suggests the use of a quadratic formulation for the debt ratio as higher debt levels may induce 
more stabilizing fiscal reactions. However, a higher debt ratio also causes a rise in interest 
payments, resulting in a worsening of the fiscal balance. As a consequence, the overall effect of 
the debt ratio on budget balances is not a priori clear. Indeed, the coefficients of the level and the 
squared level of the debt-to-GDP ratio are insignificant with p-values between 0.15 and 0.22. 
Again, the election effect remains unchanged. 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
As Buti and van den Noord (2003) point out, in the run-up to the monetary union the incentives 
for national policy makers to stick to the announced consolidation path were quite strong since 
failure of meeting the convergence criteria carried the penalty of exclusion from the euro area. 
This was considered too hard a political sanction. However, things may be different once a 
country has been admitted in the monetary union. That is, unlike the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, sticking to the rules of the SGP may not pay politically. This holds true especially for 
large countries (see De Haan et al., 2004). Moreover, the adoption of fiscal consolidation policies 
  15during the run-up to the monetary union might have created the room of manoeuvre for 
politically-motivated fiscal actions. 
This paper examines whether there is a PBC in EU member countries in the euro area 
despite the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact. We concentrate on EU members that have 
adopted the euro since the rules of the SGP are less strict for member countries that are not part of 
the currency union. We use a more sophisticated approach than previous studies that focused on 
the recent fiscal policy experience of EU member countries. Using data for the period 1999-2004 
we find strong evidence that the SGP did not restrict policy makers in pursuing expansionary 
fiscal policies before elections. In an election year – but not in the year prior to the election – the 
budget deficit increases. This result is in line with third generation PBC models, which are based 
on moral hazard. We also find that fiscal policy is somewhat more expansionary under left-wing 
policy makers. 
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  18Appendix: Data sources  
(Cyclically adjusted) net lending. Statistics on general government net lending and cyclically 
adjusted net lending were obtained from the Statistical Annex to European Economy, published in 
spring 2005. Statistics for 1998, which were necessary to calculate the change in net lending for 
1999, were obtained from Eurostat. 
 
Forecasting errors in GDP growth rates and inflation. Statistics regarding outcomes of GDP 
growth and GDP deflators were obtained from the Statistical Annex to European Economy, 
published in spring 2005. Forecasts on these variables were obtained from the countries’ stability 
programmes as published one year in advance. In order to ensure that time intervals between 
forecast and realisation dates are comparable across the sample, forecasts from stability 
programmes published after January of the year under consideration were not used. They were 
substituted by European Commission Autumn Forecasts presented in issues of European 
Economy that were published during the year preceding the year under consideration. This way, 7 
out of 72 observations were replaced.  
 
Output gap. Statistics regarding output gaps based on trend and potential GDP were obtained 
from the Statistical Annex to European Economy, published in spring 2005. 
 
General election dates and cabinet crises. Statistics for 1998 to 2003 are obtained from political 
data yearbooks (Katz and Koole (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) and Van Biezen  and Katz 
(2004)). Election data for 2004 were obtained from the online version of the Europa Yearbook 
(http://www.europaworld.com). 
 
Type of government and government fractionalisation. Statistics on the number of parties and 
ministers in the government were obtained from the same sources used to obtain data on election 
dates and cabinet crises. In case a change of government occurred during the year, averages were 
taken using the percentage of the year during which each government was in power. In calculating 
the number of parties, independent cabinet members were excluded. In calculating the number of 
ministers, finance ministers or ministers for the budget were excluded. Junior ministers, 
secretaries of state and ministers to the prime minister were not taken into account either. 
 
Government positioning on a left-right scale. Data on party colour were obtained from Benoit and 
Laver (2005). However, for France data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al., 
2001) was used, which did not affect the results. In fact, using only the CMP data in constructing 
the variable leads to identical conclusions. 
 
Debt to GDP ratio. Statistics on debt ratios were obtained from the Statistical Annex to European 
Economy, published in spring 2005. 
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